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Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) have become 
one of the key players in extensively integrated 
economies since they have gained an important 
ground in transmitting new technologies, manage-
rial techniques, skills, and capital across borders1. 
In this context, to benefit from new technology, 
knowledge and market opportunities, domestic 
policy makers (as well as firms) encourage foreign 
firms to establish local subsidiaries2. Alongside 
their effect on local firm productivity through 
technology transfers, investments by foreign firms 
have important implications for local labor market 
conditions. According to the World Investment 
Report (UNCTAD, 2007) around 3% of worldwide 
employees work for foreign affiliates of MNEs, 
representing a threefold increase from 1990 to 
2006 in the absolute number of these workers. The 
same report further emphasizes the importance 
of understanding the impact of increased foreign 
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ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the authors construct a model that allows for joint discussion of foreign firm and skill 
premium in wages, and their evolution upon increased foreign firm activities. They allow for (1) dynamic 
interaction between the domestic and foreign firms in the labor market, via a two-sided search model, 
(2) technology differentials between domestic and foreign firms, and (3) varying cost of doing business 
between domestic and foreign firms. Analytical and numerical results point to the importance of model-
ing all three features. Both the level and the changes in the relative wages depend on the productivity 
differential (technology gap) and the job creation costs.
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employment opportunities by foreign firms, where 
the share of employment in foreign affiliates in 
total employment ranges from around 1% in Japan 
to as high as 51% in Ireland3.
The effects of increased foreign firm presence 
is not limited to employment effects in the host 
country labor market, in fact two stylized facts 
stand out in the data regarding the wage effects 
of MNE activities. First, a change in the structure 
of domestic production upon the entry of foreign 
firms alters the wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers (see Gopinath & Chen, 2003; 
Markusen & Venables, 1997, among others). 
Second, foreign firms tend to pay different wages 
than domestic firms (see Aitken, et al., 1996; 
Feenstra & Hanson, 1996; Lipsey & Sjöholm, 
2004, among others). The literature is dominated 
by theoretical studies that explore the first issue 
regarding the relative wages between the skilled 
and unskilled labor, i.e. the skill premium, and 
by empirical studies exploring the second issue 
regarding the relative wages paid by foreign and 
domestic firms, i.e. the foreign firm premium.
The evidence detailed in these studies regarding 
the evolution of both the skill and foreign firm 
premium is quite mixed across host countries. 
Regarding the skill premium’s evolution evi-
dence suggests an upward move for several host 
countries, but with ample countries experiencing 
the exact opposite trend. Looking into the wage 
effects of international economic integration, 
studies have shown mixed evidence regarding 
the issue4. A similar mixed pattern is suggested 
in studies of the relative wages paid by foreign 
and domestic firms. While studies by Driffield 
and Girma (2003), Conyon et al. (2002), Martins 
(2004), and Aitken et al. (1996) document higher 
wages being paid by foreign firms, Lipsey and 
Sjöholm (2004), Almeida (2007), Barry et al. 
(2005), and Girma et al. (2001) note that foreign 
firms do not always pay more than local firms. 
None of the existing studies look into the joint 
determination of the skill and foreign firm premia. 
This chapter fills this gap in the literature, building 
a framework that explains the two observations 
synchronously and allowing for a detailed para-
metric identification of the absolute and relative 
wage implications of increased MNE activities in 
the host country. The below framework further-
more allows investigation of employment effects 
of MNE activities alongside their wage effects, 
which enriches the analysis.
Another important issue, alongside the lack of 
simultaneous discussion of the two-wage premia, 
is the mixed empirical and theoretical evidence 
regarding the evolution of both skill and foreign 
firm premia which raises the question of what 
factors contribute to this nonlinearity. The com-
mon theme in the theoretical models studying the 
skill premia effects of increased MNE activities 
is that the effects of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) on relative wages in the source and the 
host countries depends on the characteristics of 
the investment and the conditions in the invested 
environment5. Studies on the second empirical ob-
servation, regarding the differential wages across 
domestic and foreign firms, resonates a similar 
absorptive capacity6 story with differing foreign 
firm premium across developing countries. Such 
evidence can be interpreted as suggesting that 
the foreign firm premia also differs across host 
countries depending on the absorptive capaci-
ties, either of the local market or of the firm. The 
important message to be taken from this strand of 
the literature is that the local conditions as well 
as the investment characteristics, which we will 
lump in the term absorptive capacities matters in 
the determination of the wage effects of increased 
foreign presence7.
The below framework incorporates two im-
portant dimensions of these absorptive capacities. 
First, taking cue from the existing studies that show 
the important role played by the technology gap 
in explaining wage effects of MNE activities the 
model includes productivity differential between 
domestic and foreign firms (see Glass & Saggi, 
2002; Sayek & Sener, 2006). Inclusion of the 
technology gap across firms in the model captures 
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the absorptive capacities that are due to the firm 
characteristics. As MNEs are considered to be an 
important mechanism for technology diffusion to 
local markets, an impressive body of empirical 
evidence has developed around the spillover ef-
fects of MNEs to identify the potential channels 
of spillovers. Vertical spillovers, which are created 
by the backward and forward linkages, take place 
between foreign affiliates and local firms (Alfaro 
& Rodriguez-Clare, 2004; Lall, 1995; Rodriguez-
Clare, 1996; Aitken & Harrison, 1999; Görg & 
Greenaway, 2004; Javorcik, 2004). Horizontal 
spillovers arise as a result of imitation, demonstra-
tion effects, reverse engineering or competitive 
pressure exerted by foreign firms (Mansfield & 
Romeo, 1980; Blömstrom, 1986).
As noted above absorptive capacities can fur-
ther differ across countries due to differences in 
the business/investment environment. One such 
difference is due to differential administrative costs 
incurred across local and foreign firms, and across 
countries. Morisset and Neso (2002), in a novel 
data collection effort identify such a variation in 
administrative costs. For example, they find that 
in India the foreign firms face 12 times larger 
monetary administrative barriers in doing busi-
ness than local firms do. The same ratio is found 
to vary from 8 in Turkey, to 3 in Chile and 2 in 
Argentina. Such discrepancy, we find below, plays 
a significant role in explaining the differential 
skill and foreign firm premium observed across 
countries. Rudimentary evidence is also available 
from a comparison of the skill premium between 
Chile and Argentina, for which Morriset and Neso 
(2002) find a 50% differential in the relative cost 
of doing business between foreign and local firms. 
The Inter-American Development Bank’s (IDB) 
2004 report on the Latin American region reports 
that the skill premium in Argentina was much 
lower than that observed in Chile. In short, the 
below framework suggests that there could be a 
link between these administrative costs, the extent 
of MNE activities and relative wages8.
Such differential cost of doing business across 
local and foreign firms is also evident in the sum-
mary data from the Investment Climate Assess-
ment (ICA) reports of the World Bank. Summary 
indicators from the ICA suggests that the “share 
of firms that thought labor regulations were more 
than moderately investment hindering” differs 
extensively across multinational and local firms 
in host countries. For example, in Brazil while 
47 percent of foreign firms consider that labor 
regulations in Brazil hinder investment the same 
share increases to 57 percent when asked to local 
firms. The same distribution differs drastically in 
the Philippines, where a larger share of foreign 
firms (61 percent) views labor market regulations 
as a hindrance to investment than local firms (22 
percent)9. Such variation in labor market regula-
tion perceptions across firms and countries, as 
well as more general administrative cost measures 
suggests that these costs should also be included 
among the usual suspects of absorptive capaci-
ties. As such the below framework includes costs 
of doing business in the local labor market that 
differ between local and foreign firms10.
The last piece of evidence on the differential 
labor market costs between local and foreign firms 
suggests that using a search model framework 
would allow inclusion of such frictions in the 
model easily while studying the wage and em-
ployment dynamics of increased MNE activities. 
As such, below the question of how the skill and 
foreign firm premia are affected from increased 
MNE activity is studied by means of a search 
model. Search and matching models have a crucial 
role in explaining the labor market transitions, 
providing a very suitable framework to study the 
labor market fluctuations following the entry of 
foreign firms. The important role played by job 
creation costs in allowing for the search models to 
capture the fluctuations in the mass of vacancies, 
wages, and unemployment rates are discussed in 
detail in several studies including Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1994), Faggio and Konings (2003), 
Shimer (2003), Vanhala (2004), and Carlson et 
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al. (2006), among others. These differential job 
creation costs are expected to have implications 
on the job creation patterns across domestic and 
foreign firms.
In the following analysis the basic structure 
of Gautier (2002), Albrecht and Vroman (2002) 
and Dolado et al. (2003) is adopted to study the 
wage premia upon increased MNE activity. While 
Gautier (2002) has good and bad jobs the below 
framework will have domestic firm and foreign 
firm jobs. Furthermore, our framework is parallel 
to this work in that there is heterogeneity across 
workers and on-the-job search is allowed for. In 
the below framework, increased heterogeneity 
of posted vacancies due to the entry of foreign 
firms, encourages on-the-job-search. An important 
feature of the below model is that it allows for 
a two-sided search, where workers (both skilled 
and unskilled) that are already employed by local 
firms can perform on-the-job search that allows 
them to move to foreign firms and vice versa. 
Inclusion of this two-sided search feature in the 
model is justified empirically. Empirical evidence 
on the mobility of workers in the FDI literature 
suggests that foreign firms try to attract experi-
enced skilled and unskilled workers performing 
local jobs to compensate for their lower level of 
information on the host market. While foreign 
firms will try to allude workers from local firms 
to compensate for information frictions, local 
firms will try to allude workers from the foreign 
firms to benefit from technological spillovers11. 
This basic structure is extended to allow for two-
sided search by all types of labor. In summary, 
the below analysis contributes to studying the 
skill and foreign firm premium implications of 
international factor movements by allowing for 
the empirically well-justified two-sided search12.
In summary, the goal of the following analysis 
is to study two questions: whether or not foreign 
firms always pay more than local firms do and 
how the skill and foreign firm premia evolve 
upon increased foreign firm activity in the local 
economy. In constructing the model, the three 
important issues identified above are accounted 
for. First and foremost, the model allows for the 
joint determination of the skill and foreign firm 
premium and adds to the existing analysis in the 
literature. Second, the model incorporates absorp-
tive capacities that are due to firm-characteristics 
(i.e. the technology gap) and the local economy 
characteristics (i.e. differences in costs of doing 
across local and foreign firms, which differ across 
countries). The results point to the important role 
played by these differential costs in the evolution 
of the skill and foreign firm premia as well as 
the level of the foreign firm premium. Third and 
finally, the model allows bi-directional movement 
of both skilled and unskilled labor between local 
and foreign firms by use of a search model with 
two-sided search features.
The main features of the below model can be 
summarized as follows: there are a number of 
unskilled and skilled job seekers, who are either 
unemployed or employed. Vacancies are posted 
by local and foreign firms looking for skilled and 
unskilled workers. However, job creation through 
vacancy posting is not a costless procedure, 
capturing the cost of doing business in the host 
country. The structure of job creation costs, which 
differs between local and foreign firms, plays a 
major role in the extent of vacancy creation by 
the foreign firms and is crucial in the discussion 
of the effects of MNEs on the labor market. Job 
seekers and firms meet according to the match-
ing function. When a worker and firm meet, the 
wage is set in accordance with the Nash bargain-
ing approach. In this matching process, skilled 
and unskilled workers (both in the foreign and 
local firms) can engage in on-the-job-search13. 
By allowing on-the-job-search, it is possible that 
skilled and unskilled workers in local (foreign) 
firms switch into foreign (local) firms. In addition, 
different productivities across firms and workers 
are allowed for. The analytical results provide 
two very important results. First, an increase in 
the vacancies posted by local (foreign) firms will 
increase the wages paid by local (foreign) firms to 
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both skilled and unskilled worker, while reducing 
the wages paid by foreign (local) firms to both 
skilled and unskilled workers. Second, the level of 
premium paid to working at a foreign firm rather 
than a domestic firm can be positive or negative, 
and this as well as the absolute level depends on 
the technology gap between the local and foreign 
firms and the cost of doing business for both local 
and foreign firms.
Due to nonlinearities in the equilibrium wage 
equations, the discussion of relative wages is un-
dertaken numerically. Numerical solutions suggest 
that, under the baseline choice of parameters, a 
higher share of foreign firm presence reduces the 
skill premium and increases the foreign firm pre-
mium in the local economy. The solutions further 
point to the important differences in these results 
when the cost of vacancy creation is altered for both 
local and foreign firms, versus when the playing 
levels is changed to favor the foreign firm only. In 
summary, within this framework we can conclude 
that wage dispersion across foreign and local firms 
stems from not only productivity differentials but 
also from the extent of job creation; and the same 
factors influence the direction and magnitude of 
the wage effects of increased foreign presence.
Accordingly, the chapter is organized as fol-
lows: section 2 presents the main characteristics 
of the model, section 3 provides an equilibrium 
analysis and displays wages, and is followed by 
a numerical example in section 4. Section 5 sum-
marizes and concludes.
2. THE MODEL
The basis of the set-up is a standard labor search 
model, enriched by allowing for on-the-job search. 
The following model adds two important features 
to the standard framework: on-the-job search, 
which is possible in both directions between do-
mestic and foreign firms, and differential costs of 
job posting between domestic and foreign firms. 
Both assumptions are well justified by empirical 
evidence discussed in the above section 1.
Better matching opportunities arise to work-
ers through on-the-job-search. Already employed 
workers either search while already in a job due 
to deterioration of their job satisfaction (or an 
improvement in outside options) or because of the 
quality of their match with the firm turns out to 
be unsatisfactory (Krause & Lubik, 2006). While 
the on-the-job search feature is justified from the 
workers aspect, it is also a necessary feature in 
a model of MNE activity. In summary, as noted 
above, the basic structure of the below model fol-
lows Gautier (2002), Albrecht and Vroman (2002), 
and Dolado et al. (2003) with extensions of two 
sided on-the-job search opportunities.
Another important feature of the below model 
is the inclusion of differential “costs of doing 
business” across MNEs and local firms. The costs 
of doing business will be captured by the cost of 
posting and filling up job vacancies. Represent-
ing these general costs reflective of the overall 
investment climate is most suitable with those 
related to the job market in a labor search model 
framework.
Foreign firms create various job opportunities 
depending on their activities in the host country14. 
To compete and prosper, both foreign and local 
firms are expected to restructure their activities, 
facilities, and skills and tailor them to the chang-
ing technologies. In this context, both firms offer 
various job opportunities for skilled and unskilled 
workers while restructuring their activities. Stud-
ies show that foreign-owned enterprises are the 
more dynamic ones in terms of job creation/
destruction. This dynamism comes from their 
ability to fire unproductive workers and hire new 
ones, destroy inefficient jobs and create efficient 
ones, close down plants and establish new ones 
given less binding political and social constraints 
(Faggio & Konings, 2003). Thus, they are able 
to undertake the fundamental changes necessary 
for restructuring. The below model assumes dif-
ferential costs across foreign and domestic firms 
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in such restructuring with implications on the 
endogenously determined job creation/destruction 
rates of both firms, refraining from exogenously 
enforcing different rates of job creation by foreign 
and local firms.
The costs of job creation are justified empiri-
cally and theoretically. Restructuring in the labor 
market by means of job creation is not a costless 
procedure15. Firms must create a vacancy to hire 
new workers. Particularly, vacancies are known 
as a form of investment and firms must incur a 
cost to reach job seekers and to acquire informa-
tion on the characteristics of applicants. Due to 
the informational frictions in the labor market, 
firms experience difficulties in matching with 
suitable job seekers. To overcome the informa-
tional hurdle and to make the vacancy visible, 
firms spread information about the characteristics 
of their vacancies by using various recruitment 
methods such as public employment services, 
advertisement and/or private employment agen-
cies (Russo, et al., 2005). The firms not only 
incur costs at the initial vacancy posting stage but 
incur further costs at all stages of recruiting such 
as the cost of posting, advertising and screening 
pertaining to all vacancies and the cost of initial 
training (Fonseca, et al., 2001; Hammermesh, 
1993; Russo, et al., 2005). Actually, firms use dif-
ferent search strategies and different recruitment 
methods, thus, they follow different job creation 
policies depending on the cost structures. In this 
regard, when investing in a new host economy 
by means of new job opportunities, foreign firms 
need to spend some effort in order to locate better 
matching opportunities, furthermore they have to 
incur costs associated with operating in an unfa-
miliar foreign environment (Fosfuri, et al., 2001). 
Given the important and differential role of job 
creation costs across domestic and foreign firms 
the below model incorporates such costs as crucial 
ingredients in the set-up. The basic ingredients 
of the framework are discussed in the following 
sub-section 2.1, followed by a discussion of the 
matching between employees and employers in 
sub-section 2.2., and finally the bargaining and 
wages are discussed in sub-section 2.3 to complete 
the depiction of the framework.
2.1. Basic Assumptions
Consider a continuous time model in which work-
ers are infinitely lived and risk neutral. The mea-
sure of workers is normalized to one. We assume 
that the distribution of skills across workers is 
exogenous: µ ∈ ( , )0 1 share of the workers are 
unskilled ι( )while the remaining fraction, 1− µ
, are skilled s( ) . There are two types of jobs: L( )
and foreign jobs F( ) . These jobs can be performed 
by both types of workers. Let yj
i denote the flow 
output of a job of type i L F ,=( ) that is filled by 
a worker of type j =( )ι,s . Assumptions on pro-




L> and y yF Lι ι>
That is, the flow output that would result from 
a match between a skilled worker and a foreign 
firm is higher than the flow output from a match 
between a skilled worker and a local firm. A 
similar situation applies to unskilled workers. This 
follows the empirical evidence that foreign firms 
are more productive than local firms, which is a 
widely accepted fact in the literature (see Dunning, 
1993; Caves, 1996; Conyon, et al., 2002, among 
many others). Assuming foreign firms act as a 
source of new technology, production process, 
managerial technique or a new organizational 
form (Fosfuri, et al., 2001), workers are more 
productive in foreign firms. This discrepancy in 
productivities of similar workers across different 
firms is what we label as the technology gap. Job 
destruction is exogenous at rate δ . Whenever a 
job is destroyed the worker becomes unemployed 
and the job becomes vacant. During unemploy-
ment, workers receive an unemployment benefit 
of b .
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As noted above, the firms incur costs associ-
ated with job creation. These costs include both 
those related to the initial recruitment activity and 
the follow-up costs associated with continuous 
training opportunities and necessities presented 
to the skilled and unskilled workers. While both 
domestic and foreign firms are expected to incur 
these types of costs, evidence suggests that these 
costs differ across the two types of firms. The 
information frictions present in the host country 
are expected to be higher for the foreign firms 
than the domestic firms due to their lack of fa-
miliarity with the business environment (see for 
example Fosfuri, et al., 2001). Evidence further 
suggests that MNEs offer more training to work-
ers than the domestic firms do. The World Bank 
ICAs suggest that, for example, in Brazil while 
94 percent of foreign firms reported they offer 
formal (beyond “on the job”) training to their 
permanent employees 66 percent of local firms 
did so16. Therefore, it is reasonable to base the 
below model on the premise that the cost of job 
generation is higher for foreign firms than that of 
the local firms. Denoting the costs of job creation 
in the local and foreign firms as cL and cF , re-
spectively, we assume c cF L> , where F stands 
for foreign firms and L stands for local firms17. 
Finally, the model allows for two-sided search, 
where workers already employed are allowed to 
conduct on-the-job search in both domestic and 
foreign firms and are allowed to move in any 
direction between the two types of firms.
2.2. Matching
Suppose that there are vacancies posted by local 
and foreign firms looking for skilled s( ) and 
unskilled ι( )workers. Workers and vacancies 
meet according to the matching function qι ⋅( )
and qs ⋅( ) , which is increasing in the relevant 
amount of job seekers and vacancies. Specifi-
cally, the total number of matches between a 
worker and a firm is determined by the standard 
Cobb-Douglas matching function:
q v v u e e
u e e v v
L F L F
L F L F
ι ι ι ι
ι ι ι
α α
+( ) + +( ) 




q v v u e e
u e e v v
s L F s s L s F
s s L s F L F
+( ) + +( ) 




where vL is the mass of local vacancies, vF is the 
mass of foreign vacancies, uι is the mass of un-
employed unskilled workers, us is the mass of 
unemployed skilled workers, e Lι, and es L, stand 
for the number of unskilled and skilled workers 
performing local jobs, e Fι, and es F, are number of 
unskilled and skilled workers in the foreign firm; 
and α corresponds to the elasticity of matching 
with respect to the mass of job seekers. The num-
ber of unemployed workers in the host country is 
denoted by u which is the sum of uι and us .
The labor market tightness for unskilled and 



















which are the ratio of total job vacancies to total 
unskilled and skilled job seekers, respectively. In 
tight (slack) labor markets the pool of job seekers 
shrinks (enlarges) and the degree of competition 
among firms intensifies (lessens) (see Russo, et 
al., 2005, among others). In summary, an increase 
in θι or θs implies increased job market tightness; 
which is from the perspective of the employer. 
Accordingly, the rate at which firms meet an 
unskilled job seeker is equal to
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and the matching rate at which firms meet a skilled 
worker is equal to q qs s s
s
sθ θ










the rate at which unskilled and skilled workers 
meet a vacant job is equal to θ θ θι ι ι ι
α⋅ ( ) = −q 1
and θ θ θ αs s s sq⋅ ( ) = −1 , respectively. Given the 
properties of the matching function, the matching 
rate of firms qι ιθ( )and qs sθ( ) is decreasing in θι
and θs , that is, qι ιθ
' ( ) ≤ 0 and qs s' θ( ) ≤ 0 , while 
the matching rate of workers θ θι ι ι⋅ ( )q and 
θ θs s sq⋅ ( ) is increasing in θι and θs , respectively. 
In tight labor markets, the matching rate of firms 
decreases while the matching rate of workers 













, which represents the share of 
local vacancies in total vacancies.
The labor market mobility acts as a movement 
from unemployment to employment, from job to 
job and back to unemployment. That is, unem-
ployed unskilled and skilled workers move into 
local and foreign firms and workers in local and 
foreign firms may fall into the unemployment pool 
and the workers in the local (foreign) firms may 
switch into the foreign (local) firms. The steady 
state conditions require that the flows into and 
out of unemployment for both types of workers 
be equal. Accordingly, the steady state conditions 




1− = −( )u u  (1)
θ δ µαs s su u
1 1− = − −( )  (2)
where Equation (1) reflects the flow conditions 
for the unskilled labor. That is, a flow θι
α1− of 
unskilled unemployed workers find employment 
in firms, which equals to the flow of unskilled 
workers into unemployment due to the job destruc-
tion, δ µ ι−( )u . Similarly, Equation (2) is the 
flow condition for the skilled workers. The same 
flow conditions for the movement in and out of 
the local and foreign firms are depicted in Equa-
tions (3) through (6).





1 1 1− −+( ) = + −( )( )u e eF L, ,  (3)





1 11− −−( ) +( ) = +( )u e eL F, ,  (4)
Since we allow for on-the-job-search for both 
workers in the local and foreign firms, we have 
equations for local and foreign firms stating that 
in the steady state the flow of unskilled workers 
into local firms, θ ηι
α
ι ι
1− +( )u e F, is equal to the 
flow of unskilled workers out of local firm, 
δ θ ηι
α
ι+ −( )( )−1 1 e L, . 
The flow θ ηι
α
ι ι
1 1− −( ) +( )u e L, of currently 
employed unskilled workers into the foreign firm 
equals the flow out of foreign firms, δ θ ηι
α
ι+( )−1 e F,
. The same is valid for the skilled workers, which 
are captured in Equations (5) and (6).
θ η δ θ ηα αs s s F s s Lu e e
1 1 1− −+( ) = + −( )( ), ,  (5)
θ η δ θ ηα αs s s L s s Fu e e
1 11− −−( ) +( ) = +( ), ,  (6)
2.3. Bargaining and Wages
The Nash wage bargaining model is widely used 
in matching models of the labor market18. In the 
following model, we take the same approach and 
allow for wages to be determined via the Nash 
bargaining framework. When a worker and a firm 
meet, the wage is set in accordance with the Nash 
bargaining solution; that is, workers explicitly 
negotiate over wages with their employers. Wage 
offers are treated as endogenous outcomes of job 
movement decisions made by the workers and 
firms as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999).
In equilibrium, we consider four types of 
matching: skilled workers in foreign and local 
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jobs and unskilled workers in local and foreign 
jobs, respectively. The surplus of the match be-
tween firms and workers is shared according to 
the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. The 
surplus of a match, S i j=( ), , between a job 
i L F( , )= and a worker of type j s=( )ι, is given 
as follows:
S i j W i j J i j V i U j, , ,( ) = ( )+ ( )− ( )− ( )
where W i j,( )denotes the value of employment 
for a worker of type j in a job of type i , J i j,( )
is the value for the firm of filling a job of type i
by a worker of type j , V i( ) is the value of the 
vacant job and U j( )denotes the value of unem-
ployment. Matches are consummated whenever 
the joint surplus S i j,( ) is nonnegative, that is:
W i j J i j V i U j, ,( )+ ( ) ≥ ( )+ ( )
When a match is formed, the wage wj
i is 
given by the Nash bargaining condition:
W i j U j W i j J i j V i U j, , ,( )− ( ) = ( )+ ( )− ( )− ( ) β  
(7)
where β ∈ ( )0 1, is the exogenous surplus share 
of workers. β reflects the bargaining power of 
workers.
Asset Values
We next develop expressions for the various 
value functions. In doing this, let r denote the 
discount rate, which is assumed to be the same 
for both individuals and firms. We start by dis-
cussing the asset values for workers. The asset 
value of an unskilled unemployed worker, 
U ι( ) , satisfies:
r U b W L U
W F U
⋅ ( ) = + ( )− ( )( )
+ −( ) ( )− ( )( )
−
−
ι θ η ι ι










where the first term on the right hand side is the 
lump-sum unemployment benefit, b , and the 
second term refers to the change in the value of 
unskilled unemployed worker when (s)he becomes 
employed in the local firm. The third term is the 
value gained by being employed in the foreign 
firm.
Similarly, given the assumption that skilled 
workers accept both types of jobs, local and for-
eign, the asset value of unemployed skilled work-
ers, s( ) , verifies:
r U s b W L s U s
W F s U s
s
s
⋅ ( ) = + ( )− ( )( )












The second and third terms in Equation (9) 
denote the change in the value of skilled worker 
if (s)he is employed in local and foreign firms, 
respectively.
The value of a j type worker employed in 
local and foreign firms satisfies the following 
equations:
r W L j w U j W L j
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where the first terms in Equation (10) and (11) are 
the workers’ wage in the local and foreign firms, 
respectively, and the second terms are the value 
loss of becoming unemployed, and the third terms 
are the expected return from being successful in 
on-the-job search.
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The values of local and foreign vacancies are 
given, respectively, by:
r V L c A J L V L
B J L s V L
L
s
⋅ ( ) = − + ( )− ( )( )
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of unskilled workers applying for a local job in 
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are the share of un-
skilled and skilled workers applying for a foreign 
job in the total job seekers, respectively. Values, 
given in Equations (12) and (13), of local and 
foreign vacancies reflect the assumption that both 
worker types are capable of performing the local 
and foreign jobs, but the value of filling the local 
or a foreign job with a skilled or an unskilled 
worker differs. A firm who posts a vacancy must 
pay a recruitment cost of ci , where i L F= , . 
Given free entry, all profit opportunities from 
posting vacancies are exploited, hence, in equi-
librium, V L V F( ) = ( ) = 0 .
The values to the firm of filling these vacancies 
with worker type j verify:
r J L j y w






⋅ ( ) = −
+ + −( )( ) ( )− ( )( )−
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,δ θ ηα1 1
 (14)
r J F j y w






⋅ ( ) = −




where the terms, y wj
L
j




the output of a worker minus the wage paid to the 
worker. The last term in each equation captures 
the value loss in case of exogenous job destruction 
or transferring into local/foreign firms.
Steady State
Next, we concentrate on the steady state equilib-
rium, which satisfies the following conditions:
1.  Match formation is mutually advantageous 
relative to the alternative of continuing 
search (Albrecht & Vroman, 2002).
2.  The values of maintaining local and foreign 
vacancies are zero in the steady state.
3.  The appropriate steady state labor market 
flow conditions are satisfied. That is, flow 
into and out of unemployment, local and 
foreign firms will be equal, respectively. In 
addition, the share of local vacancies in total 
vacancies, η , should fall within the range 
0 1,[ ] and labor market tightness should 
satisfy θι > 0 , θs > 0 .
3. EQUILIBRIUM
In order to discuss the implications of increased 
foreign firm activity on the skill and foreign firm 
premia we next define the equilibrium of the 
model19. The equilibrium is determined by two 
job creation conditions, plus the steady state 
conditions equalizing the flows into and out of 
unemployment, local and foreign firms, for both 
types of workers. Given exogenous variables that 
capture the productivity of labor yj
i( ) , the bar-
gaining and matching environment α β,( ) , the 
job destruction rate δ( )  and job creation costs 
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c cL F,( ) , the share of unskilled workers in total 
population µ( )  and the interest rate r( ) , we will 
solve for the mass of vacancies vL  and vF ; 
wages, i.e. wFι , ws
L  and ws
F , the labor market 
tightness θι  and θs , and unemployment rate uι
and us .
Recall Equations (1) and (2) which capture 
the flow conditions of workers. We can solve for 
the unemployment rate of unskilled and skilled 
workers, uι and us , as a function of labor market 
tightness θι( )and θs( ) , and the exogenous vari-



































 are derived by re-arranging the 
terms in Equations (16) and (17). Given µ  and 
δ , the unemployment rate of skilled workers is 
decreasing in the labor market tightness of the 
skilled workers θs , while the unemployment rate 
of unskilled workers is decreasing in the labor 
market tightness of the unskilled workers θι .
Since equilibrium requires that V L( ) = 0 and 














































































































The total amount of vacancies and their al-
location across markets are determined by these 
conditions given above. Actually, Equations (18) 
and (19) are defined as job creation conditions. 
These conditions equate the benefit to the firm of 
filling vacant positions with the suitable candidate 
and the cost of opening vacancies. In other words, 
both equations relate the expected cost of a posted 
vacancy to the expected benefit of a filled job. For 
instance, if the left hand side of either equation is 
smaller than the right hand side, then entry to labor 
market by opening a vacant position is profitable, 
so that the number of vacancies posted increases. 
This leads to a rise in the labor market tightness 
of unskilled and skilled workers until the benefits 
of job creation are consumed.
3.1. Wages
A Nash bargaining approach to wage setting is 
used to derive equilibrium wages. Substituting 
(8), (10), (14) into (7), and imposing the free-
entry condition for local vacancies, V L( ) = 0 , 
we obtain the wage rate from matching of an 
unskilled worker with a local firm:
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weights attached to the unemployment benefit 
and labor productivity, respectively. The wage of 
unskilled workers’ employed in the local firm is 
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determined by the weighted average of the un-
employment benefit, b and the output of unskilled 
worker in the local firm, yLι . Particularly, w
L
ι  
depends on the bargaining power of workers, 
β , share of local vacancies, η  and the labor 
market tightness of the unskilled workers, θι .
Substituting (8), (11), (15) into (7), and impos-
ing the free-entry condition for foreign vacancies, 
F( ) = 0 , we obtain the wage from a matching of 
an unskilled worker with a foreign firm:
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are the weights 
attached to unemployment benefit and labor pro-
ductivity, respectively. Similarly, the wage of 
unskilled workers’ working in the foreign firm is 
determined by the weighted average of unemploy-
ment benefit, b and the output of unskilled 
worker in the foreign firm, yFι . Specifically, 
bargaining power of workers, β , the share of 
local vacancies, η and the labor market tightness 
of the unskilled workers, θι , play a vital role in 
the determination of unskilled workers’ wage in 
foreign firm.
Substituting (9), (10), (14), and into (7) and 
imposing the free-entry condition for local vacan-
cies, L( ) = 0 , we obtain the wage of a skilled 
worker in the local firm, which is given as follows:
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are the weights 
attached to unemployment benefit and labor pro-
ductivity, respectively. Skilled workers’ wage in 
the local firm mainly depends on the share of 
local and foreign vacancies, bargaining power of 
workers and the labor market tightness of the 
skilled worker.
Substituting (9), (11), (15) into (7), and impos-
ing the free-entry condition for foreign vacancies, 
V F( ) = 0 , yields a wage of a skilled worker in 
the foreign firm, which is expressed as follows:
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are the weights 
attached to the unemployment benefit and labor 
productivity, respectively. The skilled workers’ 
wage in the foreign firm depends on the share of 
local vacancies, η , bargaining power of workers, 
β , unemployment benefit, b and the flow output 
of skilled worker in foreign firm, ys
F .
In similar fashion to the wage equations for 
unskilled workers in both foreign and local firms 
(depicted in Equations 20 through 22), and skilled 
workers in local firms, the mass of local and foreign 
vacancies and the productivity of workers play a 
vital role in the wage determination for the skilled 
worker employed in the foreign firm. Actually, 
wages of both unskilled and skilled workers in 
the local and foreign firms depend on labor mar-
ket tightness, share of local (foreign) vacancies 
and the bargaining power of the workers, but to 
a different extent. This is due to the fact that the 
values to the firms of filling those vacancies with 
the suitable worker depend on the mass of vacan-
cies created by the firms and the productivity of 
workers, which differs across workers and firms.
Given its central role in wage-determination it 
is important to identify factors that affect the mass 
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of vacancies created by both types of firms. The 
mass of vacancies created by local and foreign 
firms are determined by the job creation condi-
tions, which are obtained by substituting wage 
Equations given in (20)–(22) into the equilibrium 
conditions given in (18)–(19):
c
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Job creation conditions for foreign and local 
firms differ according to the costs of creating new 
jobs and productivities of the workers and this 
gives rise to equilibrium wage differentials in the 
presence of labor market frictions. Equations (24) 
and (25) can be rewritten as two equations with 
two unknowns, vL , since both θj ’s and η are a 
function of vF and vL , as are uj and eij . Since 
the extent of foreign firm activity will be measured 
by the number of vacancies posted by local and 
foreign firms these two equations are of signifi-
cance for the remaining discussion. In fact, these 
two equations suggest that the two most important 
exogenous factors that determine the extent of 
job creation by local and foreign firms are the 
differential costs of doing business across local 
and foreign firms and the productivity differentials 
across skills and firms. The remaining exogenous 
factors that influence the vacancy creation by 
local and foreign firms include labor market in-
dicators such as the bargaining power of workers, 
the skill composition of the population and the 
job destruction rate, alongside the interest rate.
The following exercise of discussing the link 
between the number of vacancies posted by local 
vL( ) and foreign vF( ) firms and absolute and 
relative wages analytically does not require that 
the exogenous factor that induces the change in 
the extent of vacancy posting by either firms be 
identified. In other words, the analytical discus-
sion has the goal of identifying the qualitative 
relationship between local and foreign firm ac-
tivities and the firm and skill wage premia. How-
ever, the quantitative results discussed in section 
4 require identification of the exogenous factor 
that alters the extent of local and foreign firm 
activities in the local economy. The model is 
quantified under the baseline assumption that it 
is the changes in the costs of doing business (cL  
and/or cF ) that trigger changes in the extent of 
local and foreign firm activity and in turn chang-
es in wages across skills and firms.
3.2. Discussion of Absolute Wages
The main question of this chapter, the effects 
of increased foreign presence on relative wages 
(across skills and firms) is analyzed through the 
effects of the provision of new job opportunities 
by both local and foreign firms on absolute wages. 
To do so we first look into how the relative weights 
of unemployment benefits and productivity are 
influenced from the job postings of local firms.
Increased job postings by local firms raises 
the probability of being matched with a local firm 
for the unemployed workers and this decreases 
the weight assigned to the return to unemploy-
ment. Thus, the effect of unemployment benefit 
on local firm wages is likely to become weaker 
with an increase in vL . On the other hand, an 
increase in the mass of local vacancies strength-
ens the weight assigned to the output produced 
by the worker in the local firm and this puts an 
upward pressure on local wages. Given that the 
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unemployment benefit is less in magnitude than 
the output from a match between the labor and 
local firm these weight changes will lead to an 
increase in the local firm wages of labor. Overall, 
an increase in the mass of local vacancies vL( )
raises the wages of both skilled and unskilled 
labor in the local firm (wLι  and ws
L ). As the 
value of filling the vacant positions increases, 
local firms are willing to pay more to fill the 
position20.
The wage effects of increased local firm job 
postings are not limited to local firm wages. The 
new positions offered by local firms decrease the 
wages in the foreign firm since they improve the 
outside option value of workers. In other words, 
the probability of being successful in the on-the-
job-search increases for the workers employed in 
the foreign firm. As foreign firms anticipate that 
workers will quit their job whenever local firms 
start to post new vacancies they tend to pay less21. 
Contrary to the case of wages paid by local firms, 
in this case, the weight of the unemployment 
benefit increases due to a rise in the local job 
opportunities. In this context, the effect of unem-
ployment benefit on wages, which is positive, 
will be more powerful. On the other hand, the 
weight of the output produced in the foreign firm 
is likely to decline in response to a rise in the lo-
cal job opportunities and the extent of the effect 
of output on foreign wages will become negli-
gible as the number of vacancies offered by local 
firms increase. Thus, we end up with two opposite 
effects on the wage of the workers hired by foreign 
firms. That is, a rise in local job opportunities 
vL( ) tends to raise the wage of workers in the 
local firm (wLι  and ws
L ), while reducing the 
wage of the workers in the foreign firm (wFι  
and ws
F ).
Increased foreign presence is captured by an 
increase in the job vacancies posted by foreign 
firms. The following discussion in fact parallels 
that regarding the wage effects of increased vL . 
The earnings of the workers in the foreign firm (
wFι  and ws
F ) increase due to the job opportunities 
created by the foreign firm vF since they have to 
pay enough to fill these new vacant positions. As 
more foreign vacancies are posted, the matching 
rates of workers increases and the increased avail-
ability of foreign jobs decrease the weight assigned 
to the unemployment benefit. In addition, the 
weight of the output produced by the worker in 
the foreign firm increases due to an increase in 
foreign job creation, and therefore the impact of 
productivity of workers in a foreign firm on 
wages will be more powerful. Overall, these two 
forces suggest that the wages paid to workers in 
the foreign firms will increase upon increased 
foreign firm activity.
On the other hand, new job opportunities cre-
ated by the foreign firm increases the outside 
option of both unemployed and employed work-
ers. Since local firms anticipate that this increase 
in the workers’ probability of being successful in 
on-the-job search reduces the match surplus, they 
tend to pay less for the workers. In this context, 
the effect of unemployment benefits on local 
wages will be more powerful upon a rise in the 
foreign job opportunities. Unemployed workers 
can accept the local job since they know that they 
are allowed to change their employee if the foreign 
firm offers new positions. The weight assigned 
to output produced from a match between a local 
firm and a worker also decreases, where the re-
duction in the effect of productivity on wages is 
on account of the local firms anticipating that the 
worker may benefit from the foreign job oppor-
tunities. In short, wages of the workers in the 
local firm decrease while wages of the workers 
in the foreign firm increase due to the increased 
foreign firm activity (a higher vF ).
In summary, within this framework wage dif-
ferentials arise from two main factors: the va-
cancy creation by local and foreign firms (vL  and 
vF ) and the productivity differentials across skills 
and firms. If the mass of local (foreign) vacancies 
increases the wages of both unskilled and skilled 
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workers are likely to rise in local (foreign) firms, 
but new jobs available in foreign (local) firms 
reduce the wages of both workers in the local 
(foreign) firm. As in Krause and Lubik (2006), 
where there are good versus bad jobs with dif-
ferential costs for firms, fluctuations in vacancies 
offered by local and foreign firms become a key 
component in explaining labor market dynamics, 
particularly, wage differentials. The productivity 
differentials across firms not only have a direct 
influence on wages but also indirectly through 
their impact on the extent of vacancy postings by 
local and foreign firms. In this regard, our findings 
parallel those in the literature where a vast num-
ber of studies note that higher wages paid by 
MNEs is largely attributable to productivity dif-
ferences. While supporting these findings we are 
able to provide a formal structure that explains 
this phenomenon where the firm premia arises in 
part due to the two-sided search, which is a mod-
eling component with empirical support. That is, 
as the likelihood of finding a foreign job in-
creases (the number of vacancies posted by foreign 
firms increase), wages paid to the workers in the 
local firm decreases since the increased likelihood 
of leaving the firm requires workers to accept a 
lower wage as a compensating differential for 
workers.
3.2. Discussion of Relative Wages
The determination of the absolute wages allows 
for a detailed discussion of the level of and evo-
lution of several wage premia upon increased 
foreign firm presence. The two economy-wide 
premia we are interested in are the skill and foreign 
firm premium defined as W w wsp s= ( )/ ι and 
W w wfp F L= ( )/ , respectively. The economy-
wide absolute wages, i.e., w w w ws
F L, , ,ι( )( ) , are 
calculated as the weighted averages of the indi-
vidual wages across skills or across firms, where 
the number of employment is used as the weights. 
In other words, the overall economy-wide skill 
premium is calculated as the ratio of the weight-
ed average of skilled workers’ wage in the foreign 
and local firms to unskilled workers’ wage in the 
local and foreign firms. Similarly, the overall 
economy-wide firm premium, is calculated as the 
ratio of the weighted average of wages paid by 
the foreign firm to the weighted average of 
wages paid by the local firm. The fact that we are 
able to solve for the absolute wage levels allows 
us to further decompose these two economy-wide 
wage premia and discuss the skill premium paid 
by local firms w ws
L L/ ι( )versus that paid by 
foreign firms w ws
F F/ ι( ) , and the foreign firm 
premium paid to unskilled workers w wF Lι ι/( )




While the literature denotes relative wages as the 
gap between skilled and unskilled wages by con-
struction the above model allows studying these 
relative wages both within and between firms and 
adds value to the literature.
While the above discussion allows for an 
analytically tractable solution for the absolute 
wages, the significant nonlinearities evident in 
equation (20) through (25) emphasizes the need 
to numerically study the evolution of the six rela-
tive wages we note above, upon increased foreign 
firm presence. To give a preview of the numerical 
solutions, one can note that this study provides a 
framework that supports the empirical evidence 
that the wage effects of increased foreign presence 
depends on several local conditions, and the firm 
and skill premia can evolve in different directions 
and magnitudes across different countries and dif-
ferent sectors. While the analytical solution does 
not seem to allow for an explicit discussion of 
the evolution of the relative wages after increased 
MNE activities, it does allow for the discussion of 
the level of the foreign firm premium for a given 
level of foreign firm activity.
As noted in the introduction section, the lit-
erature provides mixed evidence regarding the 
foreign firm premia22. Many studies (Aitken, 
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et al., 1996; Feenstra & Hanson, 1996; Lipsey 
& Sjöholm, 2004; Ruane & Uğur, 2002) argue 
that foreign firms pay more than local firms do 
due to their productivity advantage. While the 
productivity differential justifies giving higher 
wages MNEs also try to minimize labor mobility 
and attract better workers by giving these higher 
wages. The foreign firm premia implied by the 
above model also captures these factors, where 
the firm premium depends both on the extent of 
job vacancies posted by local and foreign firms, 
and the labor productivity. The results further 
suggest that the skilled (unskilled) workers in the 
foreign firm are not always paid more than skilled 
(unskilled) workers in local firm.
Specifically, our results suggest that if the 
productivity gap is negligible, foreign firms do 
not necessarily pay more than local firms. In 
this framework, the wage gap between local and 
foreign firms also depends on the allocation of 
vacancies created by the firms, which are im-
plicitly determined by the job creation conditions 
(captured by the cost differentials between local 
and foreign firms). This is in line with arguments 
in the literature that wage differentials between 
foreign and local firms should be explained by 
labor market imperfections.
Here we discuss the level of the foreign firm 
premium for skilled workers, the one for unskilled 
workers could be easily replicated. Below we are 
able to show the skilled and unskilled workers in 
foreign firms may earn more than that of the local 
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Although it is difficult to discuss an exact sign 
for the firm premium, one can argue that for a 
range of relative productivities and share of va-
cancies η( )one can show that if the productivity 
gap between foreign and local firms is suffi-
ciently large, foreign firms end up with higher 
wages even when labor market imperfections are 
taken into account.
Since the signs of the derivatives of skill 
premium and firm premium with respect to local 
and foreign vacancies are ambiguous, numerical 
solution is needed to see the effects of increased 
foreign firm activities on these relative wages. 
Accordingly, we study the absolute and relative 
wage effects of increased foreign firm activities 
in detail by providing a numerical example in 
the next section. The discussion in section 4 al-
lows further studying the effects of changes in 
the productivity levels and job creation costs on 
both absolute and a wide range of relative wages.
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, we provide a numerical example 
to illustrate the properties of the model. Our main 
objective is to study the effects of an increase in 
the foreign firm presence on a range of wages. 
However, since the extent of foreign vacancies 
posted by the foreign firms is endogenously 
determined by the labor market conditions, it is 
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necessary to discuss an exogenous factor that will 
induce a change in this endogenous indicator. The 
discussion in the model section shows that the 
extent of job creation is strictly linked to available 
technologies to the firms and the cost of creating 
vacant positions. The below exercise puts the cost 
of job creation at the center of the discussion, 
where a change in the cost of job creation alters 
the extent of either the local and/or foreign firm 
vacancy postings. Once the extent of local and/or 
foreign firm vacancy creation is determined the 
effects on absolute and relative wages as well as 
unemployment are discussed23.
The parameters are calibrated to match exist-
ing studies in the literature. Our goal is to discuss 
the effects of a change in the extent of foreign 
firm activity and not to match the results one-to-
one with any specific economy. However, to 
ensure the interpretations are representative of 
actual experiences we do compare the benchmark 
solutions to a range of observed outcomes across 
countries. Accordingly, the matching function 
is defined as follows: qs s sθ θ
α( ) = −  and 
qι ι ι
αθ θ( ) = − . The baseline parameters are set 
as follows: r = 0 05. ,  β = 0 5. ,  δ = 0 1. , 
b = 0 1. , cF = 1 6. ,  .cL = 0 8 , µ = 0 9. , α =0.5, 
ys
F = 2 5. , ys
L = 2 0. ,  .yFι = 1 6 , y
L
ι = 1 3. . All 
these parameter values are reasonable and in line 
with the other studies including Albrecht and 
Vroman (2002), Gautier (2002) and Dolado et al. 
(2003). Below, we detail some of these parameters 
that are specifically important for our discussions.
The share of unskilled labor ranges from 85% 
in developed countries to 95% in developing 
countries24. As such in the baseline case the share 
of unskilled workers in the population, µ , is as-
sumed to compose 90 percent of the total popula-










, is assumed to be around 25%. 
Previous studies suggest that the productivity gap 
between foreign and local firms ranges from 10% 
to 100% (Kimura & Kiyota, 2007; Conyon, et al., 
2002; Davies & Lyons, 1991). This range is fur-
ther supported in several studies that emphasize 
that the skilled and unskilled workers in the foreign 
firm are more productive than the ones in local 
firm and that skilled workers are more productive 
than the unskilled workers (Caves, 1996; Dunning, 
1993; Fosfuri, et al., 2001). The interest rate is 5 
percent and job destruction rate is 0.1.
As was discussed in the introduction, a novel 
dataset compiled by Morisset and Neso (2002) 
suggests that foreign firms face much larger costs 
than local firms do in terms of administrative 
barriers, ranging from being 12 times larger in 
India to twice as large in Argentina. Following 
this evidence it seems reasonable to assume that 
foreign jobs are more costly to create than local 
jobs, i.e. c cF L> . The choice of the absolute 
levels of these two costs follow a range of models 
including those by Carlson et al. (2006), Faggio 
and Konings (2001), Hammermesh (1993), 
Russo et al. (2005) and Vanhala (2004). For the 
benchmark case we set the cost of vacancy creation 
at 0 8. . In line with the evidence discussed above 
regarding the relative costs for local and foreign 
firms we set the ratio of the foreign and local 
firms’ job creation costs at 2 , i.e. the cost param-
eters are cF = 1 6. and cL = 0 8. 25. The unemploy-
ment benefit level is set at 0 1. . Under this choice 
of parameters, Table 1 presents the baseline solu-
tions.
The solution based on these benchmark pa-
rameters suggests that the share of foreign vacan-
cies is 29% of the total vacancies. According to 
Görg and Strobl (2005) the share of employment 
by foreign firms in total employment is around 
44% in Ireland. The 2007 World Investment Re-
port by UNCTAD also shows that the share of 
foreign affiliates in total employment can be as 
high as 47% and 50% as in Singapore and Ireland, 
respectively but also as low as 3% as in China 
and Portugal26. The benchmark value of 29% is 
reflective of a world average according to these 
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quite dispersed values for the share of foreign 
affiliates in total employment.
We next discuss the wages in the benchmark 
case. We focus mainly on the relative wages, given 
the difficulty in matching absolute wages with real 
data. The economy-wide skill premium is found 
to be 59%, where the relative wages of skilled 
to unskilled workers is 1.59. A decomposition of 
this skill premium across different types of firms 
suggests that the relative valuation of skills differs 
between local and foreign firms. The skill premium 
in the local firm (61%) is higher than the skill pre-
mium in the foreign firm (56%). Since the data is 
sparse on wages across local and foreign firms we 
are only able to compare the economy-wide skill 
premia with real data. This figure is in the range 
of the average of the 50% skill premium reported 
for developed countries measured from the ratio 
of nonproduction workers’ wages to production 
workers’ wages in Berman et al. (1998)27.
The economy-wide foreign firm premium is 
found to be 0.2%, where the wages paid by the 
foreign firm relative to those paid by the local 
firms is 1.002. Barry et al. (2005) reports for-
eign firm premia ranging from zero percent to 
82% across different sectors. In fact, the average 
foreign firm premium for the transportation and 
equipment, chemicals, wood, paper and printing, 
rubber plastics, non-metallic minerals and a group 
of subsectors they classify as other manufacturing 
is around 5%. This evidence suggests that the low 
foreign firm premium outcome of the benchmark 
case is reflective of observed wage premia and is 
in an acceptable range28. A decomposition of the 
foreign firm premium across skilled and unskilled 
workers suggests that the premium is much higher 
for the unskilled workers than it is for the skilled 
workers, which could be thought of as being in 
line with different extents of foreign firm premia 
across sectors which might differ in their skill 
intensities29.
Since the benchmark solution of the model is 
in line with the observed data, in the next section 
we undertake the exercise of studying the wage 
effects of increased foreign firm activity in the 
host economy. As was discussed above, the model 
requires that changes in an exogenous factor be 
modeled to induce a change in the extent of for-
eign firm activity, which in turn would affect the 
relative wages. Taking cue from the evidence in 
Table 1. Benchmark solution 
Benchmark Parameters
r = 0 05. ,  . ,β = 0 5  δ = 0 1. , b = 0 1. , c cF L= =1 6 0 8. , .
 . ,µ = 0 9 α = 0 5. ,  . , . ,y ys
F
s
L= =2 5 2 0  . ,  .y yF Lι ι= =1 6 1 3
Labor Market: Job Opportunities and Unemployment
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0.94 0.94 1.51 1.48 1.61 1.56 1.00 0.97 1.59 1.00
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the literature that the cost of doing business is an 
important factor in affecting FDI decisions we 
take the cost of vacancy creation as this exogenous 
factor. In section 4.1 the cost of job creation is 
altered, inducing changes in the mass of vacancies 
posted by both local and foreign firms and on the 
labor market outcomes.
4.1. Changes in the Cost Structure
Job creation costs play a vital role in explaining 
wage dynamics and unemployment. Actually, 
governments lower job creation costs to encourage 
foreign firm entry and to benefit from increased 
foreign firm activity. However, while in some 
cases, the government could lower only the costs 
for the foreign firms, in other cases, the reduction 
in costs could apply to both the local and foreign 
firms. We undertake exercises regarding both 
possibilities. Results presented in Table 2 study 
the former public policy environment where only 
the costs incurred by the foreign firm are altered, 
while results in Tables 3 and 4 show the latter case 
Table 2. Decrease in the job creation cost of foreign firm and its labor market implications 
Panel A: Vacancies
                                                                  .cL = 0 8
      vL                     vF                                η
cF = 3 2. 0.18 0.07 0.95
cF = 2 4. 0.21 0.03 0.86
cF = 1 6. 0.24 0.09 0.71
cF = 0 8. 0.20 0.31 0.39





































cF = 3 2. 1.03 0.86 1.77 1.32 1.70 1.53 0.82 0.74 1.70 0.81
cF = 2 4. 1.00 0.89 1.67 1.37 1.66 1.54 0.88 0.82 1.65 0.87
cF = 1 6. 0.94 0.94 1.51 1.48 1.61 1.56 1.00 0.97 1.59 1.00
cF = 0 8. 0.81 1.10 1.26 1.77 1.54 1.60 1.34 1.39 1.58 1.35
cF = 0 4. 0.74 1.27 1.12 2.09 1.51 1.65 1.71 1.86 1.63 1.73
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where a symmetric cost change occurs for both 
the local and foreign firms.
Panels A and B in Table 2 show the effects of 
an exogenous change in the job creation cost of 
foreign firms on vacancy creation and relative 
wages, keeping the cost incurred by the local firm 
constant. The benchmark case assumed that the 
cost of job creation for the foreign firms was twice 
as high as that for the local firms. In the following 





, from 0 5. to 4 . 
As the job creation cost of foreign firms’ falls, 
the cost gap between local and foreign firms melt 
down and this stimulates foreign job creation 
leading to changes in wages paid by the foreign 
firm and the local firm.
The decrease in the foreign firms’ cost of 
vacancy creation increases the foreign firm pres-
ence both in absolute terms (an increase in of vF
) and in relative terms (an increase in their share 
in total job creation captured by a lower η ). The 
increased foreign presence is accompanied by a 
decrease in the skill premium and an increase in 
the foreign firm premium. A decomposition of 
these wage premia shows that the skill premium 
moves in opposite directions across the local and 
foreign firms. The larger extent of foreign firm 
presence seems to synchronously occur with a 
decrease in the skill premium paid by local firms 
and an increase in the skill premium paid by the 
foreign firms. The decrease in the economy-wide 
skill premium suggests that the local firm’s pre-
Table 3. Decrease in the job creation cost of foreign and local firms and its labor market implications, 
keeping relative costs constant 
Panel A: Vacancies
vL vF η
c cL F= =0 8 1 6. , . 0.24 0.09 0.71
c cL F= =0 4 0 8. , . 0.50 0.21 0.69
c cL F= =0 2 0 4. , . 1.02 0.46 0.68





































c cL F= =0 8 1 6. , . 0.94 0.94 1.51 1.48 1.61 1.56 1.01 0.97 1.59 1.00
c cL F= =0 4 0 8. , . 0.95 0.96 1.51 1.49 1.58 1.56 1.00 0.98 1.58 1.00
c cL F= =0 2 0 4. , . 0.96 0.97 1.52 1.51 1.57 1.55 1.00 0.99 1.56 1.00
c cL F= =0 1 0 2. , . 0.97 0.97 1.52 1.51 1.55 1.55 1.99 0.99 1.55 1.00
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mium decline dominates the increase of the 
premium paid by the foreign firms. While the skill 
premium moves in opposite directions across 
firms, the foreign firm premium moves in the 
same direction across different skill levels of labor. 
The foreign firm premium paid to both the skilled 
and the unskilled labor increases alongside an 
increase in the foreign firm presence.
Numerically, a decrease in the foreign job 
vacancy creation cost relative to the local job 
vacancy creation cost from 4 to 3, i.e. the cost of 
foreign firms decreases from 3.2 to 2.4 while that 
of the local firms remains at 0.8, corresponds to 
a decrease of the skill premium in the local firm 
from 1.70 to 1.66 and an increase of the skill pre-
mium in the foreign firm from 1.53 to 1.54. This 
decrease in costs corresponds to a 180% (from 0.05 
to 0.14) increase in the foreign presence. While 
the skill premium within firms move in opposite 
directions, this increase in foreign presence is 
associated with a 3.3 percentage point fall in the 
economy-wide skill premium, from 1.70 to 1.65.
The premium of working for a foreign firm 
increases for both skilled and unskilled workers, 
which suggest a rise in the economy-wide foreign 
firm premium from 0.81 to 0.87 in response to 
increased foreign firm presence by 180% (from 
0.05 to 0.14). This phenomenon could be explained 
by the fact that as foreign firms offer more vacant 
positions the outside options of the workers per-
forming local jobs increase, decreasing the value 
of filling local jobs with a suitable worker, thereby 
reducing all wages paid by the local firm. In this 
context, foreign firms pay more to attract skilled 
Table 4. Decrease in the job creation cost of foreign and local firms and its labor market implications, 
keeping absolute cost difference constant 
Panel A: Vacancies
vL vF η
c cL F= =0 8 1 6. , . 0.24 0.09 0.71
c cL F= =0 7 1 5. , . 0.28 0.09 0.73
c cL F= =0 6 1 4. , . 0.32 0.09 0.76





































c cL F= =0 8 1 6. , . 0.94 0.94 1.51 1.48 1.61 1.56 1.01 0.97 1.59 1.00
c cL F= =0 7 1 5. , . 0.95 0.93 1.54 1.46 1.61 1.56 0.98 0.94 1.60 0.97
c cL F= =0 6 1 4. , . 0.97 0.92 1.57 1.44 1.61 1.55 0.95 0.91 1.60 0.94
c cL F= =0 5 1 3. , . 0.99 0.91 1.62 1.42 1.62 1.55 0.91 0.87 1.60 0.91
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and unskilled workers from both the unemploy-
ment pool and the local firms since filling new 
vacant positions will increase the value of filling 
a foreign job with suitable workers. Briefly, as the 
cost differential for creating foreign and local jobs 
becomes lower, the wage gap between skilled and 
unskilled workers in the local firm falls and the 
premium of working in a foreign firm increases.
An interesting result is that regarding the level 
of the foreign firm premium. Above a certain de-
gree of foreign firm presence, or in other words 
at levels of foreign vacancy job creation cost that 
exceeds the local firm vacancy creation costs by 
more than 100 percent, the foreign firm pays less 
than the local firm, i.e. the firm premium is less 
than zero for both skilled and unskilled labor. 
This is reversed when the foreign job creation 
cost falls to around double that of the local firm 
job creation costs and lower. One should keep in 
mind that the threshold level we find for the rela-
tive foreign firm and local firm job creation costs 
(in this case double) depends on the parameter 
values. However, regardless of the parameter 
values the results show support for one of the main 
propositions of the model discussed above, which 
suggests that the labor market conditions (costs of 
vacancy creation and productivity differentials) 
determine the level of the wage premia30.
To provide a more comparable measure of how 
changes in the cost of job creation affects the 
relative wages one can calculate elasticities. Two 
alternative elasticity measures can be considered. 
The first measure, which can be labeled as the 
cost of job creation elasticity of the indicators, is 
the ratio of the percentage point change in the 
wage premia to the percentage change in the cost 
of job creation. An alternative measure, which 
can be labeled as the foreign firm presence elas-
ticity of the relevant indicators, is the ratio of the 
percentage point change in the wage premia to 
the percentage point change in the share of foreign 
presence in the market (η ).
It is worth noting that the foreign firm presence 
elasticity of skill premium is lower than the foreign 
firm presence elasticity of the foreign firm pre-
mium at all levels of job creation costs and foreign 
firm presence. For example, a change in the cost 
of foreign firms’ vacancy creation from 2.4 to 1.6 
corresponds to an approximately doubling of the 
share of foreign vacant positions in total positions 
(i.e. the increase in 1− η from 0.14 to 0.29), a 6 
percentage point decrease in the economy-wide 
skill premium and a 13 percentage point increase 
in the economy-wide firm premium.
While the above discussion measures foreign 
presence by the share of foreign firm job offers 
in total job offers, the qualitative results would 
prevail even if one were to focus on the absolute 
number of foreign firm vacancies as the measure 
of foreign presence. In other words, the above 
discussion remains intact if one were to look into 
the corresponding wage premia changes upon an 
increase in vF 31.
It is somewhat difficult to compare these 
findings with those in the literature, since earlier 
studies do not take into account the differential 
skill premium between local and foreign firms. 
Modeling this empirically valid feature of local 
and foreign firms benefiting from skilled and 
unskilled workers in different extents (both across 
firms and across skills) allows us to add value to 
the discussions in the literature. In short, many 
of the previous studies are based on the premise 
that an increase in the relative demand for skilled 
workers by the foreign firms contributes to the 
increased skill premium in both the investing 
and the invested economies (see Feenstra & 
Hanson, 1997, for example). This result is also 
evident in our findings. However, we are further 
able to capture the indirect effects of this event 
on the skill premium offered by the local firms 
who are competing with the foreign firms in the 
labor market. Allowing for such interactions and 
competition between the local and foreign firms in 
the model allows for a more realistic framework. 
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Our results suggest that the economy-wide skill 
premium’s evolution depends on the weights at-
tached to the skill premia offered by the local and 
foreign firms, respectively. Given the cost and 
productivity parameters used in this exercise, we 
are able to show that there are cases where the 
changes in the local firm’s skill premium could 
dominate, while other parameter choices could 
suggest otherwise. This model also points to the 
importance of the productivity differences across 
firms and skills, parallel to the findings of Sayek 
and Sener (2006) who show the evolution of the 
skill premium upon entry of the foreign firms 
depends on the technology gap between local 
and foreign firms. While we echo the importance 
of the technology gap in determining the skill 
premium, we further emphasize the role played 
by the policy environment, captured by the cost 
of job creation.
We next study a change in job creation cost 
with no change in the playing field, i.e. no special 
treatment to foreign firms. To capture such a 
change in the policy environment we keep the 
relative costs constant while changing cF and cL
. Table 3 shows the results for this exercise. The 
decrease in the cost of vacancy creation has the 
same directional effect on the vacancy creation 
by both the local and foreign firms, where both 
firms increase the number of job postings. How-
ever, the extent of reaction by local and foreign 
firms differs significantly, where the local firms 
respond less to the cost decrease than the foreign 
firms do. As such, the share of foreign firms in 
the total job market offerings increases as both 
type of firms face a decrease in their cost of doing 
business.
As the share of foreign firms decline, the 
economy-wide skill premium increases and the 
economy-wide foreign firm premium pretty much 
remains constant. The decomposition of these 
premia across firms and across skills, respec-
tively, also follow the above case. An increase in 
η corresponds to an increase in the skill premium 
paid by local firms that outweighs a decrease in 
the skill premium paid by foreign firms. The 
foreign firm premium on the other hand decreas-
es for both the skilled and the unskilled labor.
Rather than keeping the relative costs constant 
we also repeat the exercise where the absolute 
difference of the vacancy creation costs are kept 
constant. The basic results of this exercise are 
presented in Table 4. This exercise suggests that 
the results could indeed differ when the absolute 
levels of costs are kept constant but the relative 
costs are altered. In this case, we find that while 
the absolute extent of foreign firm vacancies as 
well as local firm vacancies increase on account 
of lower costs of job creation the share of foreign 
firms decreases. This is a major difference from 
the above two cases, pointing to an important 
result that the evolution of the skill and foreign 
firm premium depends on the share of foreign 
vacancies and not on the absolute level of foreign 
presence in the economy.
These results point to the importance of 
studying the effects of foreign firm activity on 
the local labor market considering the changes 
in the domestic and foreign firms synchronously. 
The analysis would be misleading if one only 
considered the effects of a change in the foreign 
firm activity without taking into account the in-
teractive decision-making between the local and 
foreign firms. The above model and the numerical 
exercise that follows fills this void in the literature 
which does not take into account this dynamic 
interaction between the local and foreign firms, 
with both searching for employees from the same 
unemployment pool as well as from each other.
If one is to look at the level of foreign firm 
premium under this second case it is evident that 
similar to the theoretical predictions of the model 
and the first case discussed in Table 2 foreign firms 
do not always pay more than the local firms do. 
The wage difference between local and foreign 
firms depends on the job opportunities provided 
by local and foreign firms, which are extensively 
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determined by the cost of job creation and pro-
ductivity of workers.
Both the exercise of a change in the cost of 
only the foreign firms and a change in both firm’s 
costs suggests that an increase in the share of 
foreign firms in the local economy and not the 
absolute level of foreign firms’ activity matters 
in discussing the skill and foreign firm premium. 
Regardless of the direction of change in the ab-
solute level of foreign firms (i.e. vF ) an increase 
in the share of foreign firms (i.e. decrease in η ) 
corresponds to a decrease in the economy-wide 
skill premium and an increase in the economy-
wide foreign firm premium. A decomposition of 
both premia shows that while the foreign firm 
premium increases for all types of labor regardless 
of their skill level, the skill premium increases 
for the labor employed in foreign firms while it 
decreases for the labor employed in local firms. 
Such decomposition once more points to the 
importance of taking into account the differences 
and interactions between local and foreign firms 
and not focusing on the effects of foreign firms 
in isolation. It is known empirically that the local 
and foreign firms interact extensively in the labor 
market, where such labor turnover is actually 
thought of as a major source of productivity 
spillovers across firms. Finally, the two cases 
discussed above point to the important role played 
by the cost of job creation and productivity dif-
ferentials in the determination of the level of the 
foreign firm premium.
4.2. Technological Upgrading
Due to the technological upgrading, foreign firms 
become more productive, increasing the gap 
between ys
F and ys
L . As the output gap between 
foreign and local firms increases, foreign firms 
start to offer more positions for workers, hence, 
the share of vacancies posted by foreign firms 
increase. While foreign jobs are relatively scarce 
to start with, in particular, because the cost of 
opening foreign vacancies is higher than the cost 
of opening local vacancies, the supply of foreign 
jobs exceeds the local jobs due to the techno-
logical upgrading. In this context, in response to 
a rise in the foreign job opportunities, wages of 
the local firm decrease and wages of the foreign 
firm increase.
Here, we should also note that an increase in 
the share of foreign vacancies due to the improve-
ment in foreign firm technology puts an upward 
pressure on the overall skill premium and firm 
premium. While an increase in the share of foreign 
job offerings due to the technological progress (i.e., 
productivity advantage of the foreign firm rises) 
lowers the skill premium in the local firm, it raises 
the skill premium in the foreign firm. Actually, 
Panel B in the Table 5 reveals that technological 
progress in the foreign firm increases the premium 
of working for a foreign firm for both unskilled 
and skilled workers. This is due to the fact that 
an increase in the productivity advantage of the 
foreign firms directly generates an increase in the 
foreign wages, in particular for the skilled wages, 
but also its effect on wages becomes more powerful 
since it increases the jobs created by foreign firms.
The policy implication of the above analysis 
is that the cost of doing business does have im-
portant implications on the labor market outcomes 
and the role of foreign firms in these outcomes. 
Furthermore, there are different and important 
implications of providing special treatment to 
foreign firms or not. The effects of increased 
levels of foreign firm activities in the economy 
differs significantly across the case where only 
foreign firms’ cost of doing business is reduced 
and the case where both local and foreign firms’ 
cost of doing business is reduced. In addition, the 
manner in which these costs are reduced, i.e. 
whether the relative costs or the absolute cost 
differences are kept constant, matters.
In short, the results from the numerical ex-
ample support our theoretical predictions that the 
response of the overall skill and firm premium 
as well as the response of the absolute wages to 
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changes in the extent of labor market imperfec-
tions and foreign presence depends on several 
conditions in the market. Briefly, this experiment 
reveals that, the labor market imperfections and 
foreigners’ share in the labor market have impor-
tant non-linear effects on the wages of unskilled 
and skilled workers.
4. CONCLUSION
The increasing and diverse role of multinational 
enterprises in the labor markets of the host coun-
tries raises the important issue of their implications 
on absolute and relative wages, and unemploy-
ment patterns in the local market. Two important 
relative wages that are expected to be affected 
from increased foreign firm activity are the rela-
tive wages between skill and unskilled workers 
(skill premium) and the relative wages between 
foreign and local firms (foreign firm premium). 
Allowing for dynamic interactions between local 
and foreign firms in the labor market, through 
two-sided search by the current employees and 
a search for new employees from the same un-
employed pool of workers, and incorporating the 
empirically well-justified differential costs of 
doing business across the local and foreign firms, 
as well as productivity differentials between the 
two types of firms, this chapter is able to discuss 
the synchronous determination of the skill and the 
foreign firm premium, and study their evolution 
upon changes in the market.
Table 5. Technological upgrading 
Panel A: Vacancies
vL vF η
Baseline technology gap (%10) 0.41 0.29 0.58
Change from Baseline
Technology gap %25 0.40 0.33 0.54
Technology gap %50 0.38 0.43 0.46
Technology gap %75 0.35 0.51 0.40





































Baseline technology gap (%10) 0.90 0.95 1.19 1.21 1.32 1.27 1.05 1.01 1.30 1.04
Change from Baseline
Technology gap %25 0.88 1.03 1.17 1.36 1.32 1.33 1.16 1.17 1.32 1.16
Technology gap %50 0.85 1.27 1.12 1.69 1.31 1.33 1.48 1.50 1.32 1.49
Technology gap %75 0.82 1.52 1.08 2.03 1.31 1.34 1.83 1.87 1.33 1.84
Technology gap %100 0.80 1.86 1.04 2.49 1.30 1.33 2.32 2.37 1.33 2.33
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The analytical solutions show that an increase 
in the foreign firm presence, captured by a higher 
number of vacancy postings by the MNEs, causes 
an increase in the wages of skilled and unskilled 
workers employed by the foreign firms, while 
reducing the wages of both types of workers 
employed in the local firms. The analytical results 
further show that when the dynamic interactions 
between domestic and foreign firms, and cost of 
doing business and productivity differentials are 
taken into account the empirically observed fact 
that the foreign firm premium is not always posi-
tive can easily be explained. The highly nonlinear 
analytical results, however, do not allow for a clear 
discussion of how several relative wages (both the 
economy-wide skill and foreign firm premia, and 
the individual firm or skill premiums) evolve upon 
increased foreign firm presence. This necessitates 
solving the model numerically. Numerical solu-
tions confirm the analytical findings, and further 
show that an increase in the share of foreign firms 
corresponds to a decrease in the economy-wide 
skill premium and an increase in the economy-
wide foreign firm premium. A detailed analysis of 
these premium show that while the foreign firm 
premium increases for all types of labor regardless 
of their skill level, the skill premium increases 
for the labor employed in foreign firms while it 
decreases for the labor employed in local firms. 
In short, we find that job creation costs as well 
as the technology gap between local and foreign 
firms play a very important in the determination 
of the level of the skill and foreign firm premium, 
as well as their evolution after increased foreign 
firm presence.
Finally, our numerical results have an impor-
tant policy implication regarding those related to 
the cost of doing business for local and foreign 
firms. The labor market implications of reducing 
the costs of doing business for both the local and 
the foreign firms, versus that of giving special 
treatment to the foreign firms by reducing only 
their costs differ.
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ENDNOTES
1  See Caves (1996), Navaratti and Venables 
(2004), among others for a discussion of the 
role of MNEs in the global economy and 
their effects.
2  Throughout the text, the terms foreign firms 
and multinationals are used interchangeably.
3  See UNCTAD (2007), page 10, for a larger 
sample of countries. For example, the same 
ratio is 3% in China, 4% in the US, 7% in 
Germany, 14% in France, 22% in Hungary, 
and 47% in Singapore.
4  See Wood (1994) and Beyer et al. (1999) 
among others for contrasting evidence re-
garding trade liberalization, and Feenstra and 
Hanson (1997) and Wu (2001) for evidence 
regarding outsourcing and FDI.
5  See Lall (1995), Markusen and Venables 
(1997), Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Das 
(2002), Wu (2001), and Sayek and Sener 
(2006).
6  The aborptive capacity of the host countries 
depends on the investment characteristics 
and local conditions.
7  The literature uses the term absorptive 
capacity to capture both the local market 
conditions such as the availability of skilled 
labor, the availability of financial market 
services or extent of international integration, 
as well as the technology capacity of the lo-
cal firm, which we label as the investment 
characteristics above. See Ruane and Ugur 
(2002) for a discussion of the reasons for 
why there exists a foreign firm premium. The 
culprits underlying the foreign firm premium 
enlisted by Ruane and Ugur (2002) can be 
included among the absorptive capacities in 
the language of the below discussion.
8  The skill premium is measured as the relative 
wage between male workers with tertiary 
education and secondary education. The 
results prevail for other education level 
comparisons.
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9  Data for Brazil and the Philippines are for 
the same year, namely 2003.
10  Görg and Strobl’s (2005) empirical analysis 
of employment performances of domestic 
and foreign plants in Ireland reveals a 
slightly higher job creation rate of foreign 
firms leading to a net gain in employment 
in the foreign firms.
11  See evidence reported in Gerschenberg 
(1987), Bloom (1992), and Pack (1993) 
on movement of labor from MNEs to local 
firms in Kenya, South Korea, and Taiwan.
12  The literature on matching models with 
heterogeneous agents has developed over 
the last decade, dating back to the influential 
contributions by Mortensen and Pissarides 
(1999) and Shimer and Smith (2000).
13  In this model, the foreign returns to working 
in the foreign firm are not always higher 
than the returns to working the local firm, as 
such foreign workers also try to maximize 
their returns through on-the-job search 
efforts. Therefore, we prefer to allow for 
bi-directional movements between the local 
and foreign firms.
14  In accord with Girma et al. (2001), Wu 
(2001), and Driffield and Girma (2003), 
takeovers by MNEs should be expected to 
have differential effects on employment 
and wages across different sectors. In a 
separate work, Saglam (2007) discusses 
such differential results across sectors using 
the framework used in this chapter. Due to 
space limitations, such a comparison is not 
discussed in this chapter.
15  Carlson et al. (2006), Vanhala (2004), and 
Faggio and Konings (2003) state that as-
sumptions on job creation costs have a crucial 
role in terms of job reallocation and change 
the potential policy recommendations of the 
models.
16  The same discrepancy is evident in Peru 
where the same ratios are 78 percent and 
52 percent for foreign and domestic firms, 
respectively. For Philippines and Turkey, 
the same discrepancy is evident, where the 
same ratios are 48 percent and 14 percent, 
and 36 percent and 19 percent, respectively.
17  In the numerical simulation exercise, we 
allow for alternative ordering of these job 
creation costs. The results are provided in 
section 4.
18  See Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Al-
brecht and Vroman (2002), Gautier (2002), 
and Dolado et al. (2003) among others.
19  The proofs of uniqueness of the equilibrium 
and the stability of it are available from the 
authors upon request.
20  As the mass of vacancies increase, firms 
pay more than they need to in order to fill 
that position. Following the selection theory 
discussed in Carmichael (1990), this could 
be due to the fact that a higher wage attracts 
applicants of higher quality.
21  In the search literature, wage is a function 
of the outside option of the workers, where 
the outside option of the workers depends 
on the mass of vacancies posted by other 
firms. Thus, the increased likelihood of 
leaving the firm requires workers to accept 
lower wages and since firms anticipate the 
workers’ higher quit rate, reducing the match 
surplus, they tend to pay less. See Gautier 
(2002) and Krause and Lubik (2006).
22  While studies by Driffield and Grima (2003) 
and Martins (2004) suggest the foreign firm 
premium is always greater than zero, i.e. the 
foreign firms pay more than domestic firms 
do to workers with similar characteristics, 
Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004), Almeida (2004), 
and Barry et al. (2005) argue that the pre-
mium can be negative in some cases.
23  The framework also allows discussion of 
the relationship between skill upgrading 
and technological progress and absolute and 
relative wages, and unemployment. Due to 
space limitations, we do not report these 
exercises in depth.
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24  These figures are obtained from Barro 
and Lee (2001), measured as the share of 
population over 25 years of age that have 
completed post-secondary schooling and 
calculated as the weighted average of the 
countries classified according to the World 
Bank’s development classification. Coun-
tries are assigned weights according to their 
population. These figures also follow Sayek 
and Sener (2006).
25  Dolado et al. (2003) set the cost of job 
creation at 0.5. Since we will assume that 
foreign firms’ cost is twice that of the local 
firm to avoid having the absolute foreign 
firm job creation cost as a numeraire we set 
the benchmark cost at 0.8 rather than 0.5.
26  See Table I.5 in page 10 of the report. A 
much higher cf indeed does lead to much 
higher η values, which could correspond to 
the cases of China and Portugal.
27  The skill premium reported in the study by 
Berman et al. (1998) for developing countries 
is even larger in magnitude. The numerical 
exercise in the following analysis suggests 
that such higher skill premia can be captured 
with much higher productivity differentials 
between local and foreign firms, alongside 
with higher absolute productivity for foreign 
firms and high costs of vacancy creation for 
foreign firms. all of these necessary param-
eter restrictions are indeed realistic changes 
in modeling developing countries rather than 
developed ones, lending supporting evidence 
to our framework.
28  This evidence further points to the impor-
tance of capturing different sectoral char-
acteristics such as the technology-intensity 
in the model. In an extension of the basic 
framework built in this chapter Saglam 
(2007).
29  Barry et al. (2005) report a 4% foreign firm 
premium for the chemicals industry which 
could be thought of as skilled intensive 
compared to the textile industry for which 
they report a 33% foreign firm premium.
30  The exercise in this section also allows 
discussion of the local firm costs exceeding 
those of the foreign firms. The qualitative 
results prevail and the quantitative results 
are provided in the table.
31  One can also study the unemployment pat-
terns. Due to space limitations, the unem-
ployment figures are not reported. However, 
in summary the numerical exercise provides 
evidence of increased foreign firm presence 
corresponding to a decrease in both skilled 
and unskilled unemployment rates.
